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It was no surprise that Justice Anthony Kennedy, who has cast the decisive vote in so many important Supreme Court cases, wrote
Monday’s majority opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The court ruled in favor of a Colorado baker
named Jack Phillips who, on religious grounds, had refused to make a wedding cake for a gay couple.
What was surprising was the lopsided 7-2 vote count. Only Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor, the two dissenting justices, would
have ruled that the First Amendment’s protection of the free exercise of religion did not shield Mr. Phillips from a Colorado antidiscrimination law.
As is often the case, however, the overall vote count obscured deep disagreements among the justices who joined the majority opinion.
Justice Neil Gorsuch, joined by Justice Samuel Alito, thought Justice Kennedy’s opinion didn’t go far enough. And Justice Clarence
Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, argued that Mr. Phillips had a right to refuse service not just under the First Amendment’s “free
exercise of religion” clause but also under its “free speech” provision.
But what to make of the concurring opinion of Justices Elena Kagan and Stephen Breyer, two liberal-leaning members of the court, who
surprised many observers by joining Justice Kennedy’s opinion in full?
One explanation is simple pragmatism. Justice Kennedy’s opinion placed considerable emphasis on statements by several members of the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which had ruled against Mr. Phillips, that Justice Kennedy read as disparaging religion. Arguing that
this hostile language undermined the constitutionality of the commission’s proceedings allowed the court to conveniently sidestep the
difficult questions at the heart of the case — questions about the proper balance between a state’s power to protect its gay and lesbian
citizens from discrimination, on the one hand, and the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, on the other.
Since those questions don’t necessarily have clear answers, Justices Kagan and Breyer may have deemed it wiser to table them for the
time being. By joining Justice Kennedy, they positioned themselves to have far more influence on the reasoning and implications of his
opinion than they would have done by adding a third and fourth vote to Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.
Their concurring opinion, for example, focused on an interesting aspect of Justice Kennedy’s opinion: the emphasis he placed on the fact
that the Colorado commission had deemed it acceptable for bakers to refuse to make a cake for a customer who wanted cakes bearing antigay messages. Justice Kennedy pointed to this disparate treatment — one refusal to make cakes was deemed impermissible, the other
acceptable — as a reason to find for Mr. Phillips.
In their concurring opinion, Justices Kagan and Breyer noted — without drawing an objection from Justice Kennedy — that the
commission erred in failing to identify an important distinction between the two sorts of cases: Mr. Phillips made wedding cakes for
opposite-sex couples but refused to do so for same-sex couples, denying same-sex couples full equality under state law; but bakers who
refused to bake a cake “denigrating gay people and same-sex marriage” would not have baked such a cake for any customer — and
therefore engaged in no denial of equal treatment.
By joining Justice Kennedy’s opinion, Justices Kagan and Breyer were thus able to give the Colorado commission some clear instructions:
A do-over without the religious hostility and with a better explanation of its rationale could well result in a constitutionally sound victory
for the same-sex couple denied their cake by Mr. Phillips.
That is the power of joining an opinion: It allows justices to help shape the interpretation of that opinion by lower courts, state agencies
and other bodies that have to implement the court’s ruling — an influence that is difficult to have from a position of dissent.
When it comes to discerning the precise legal standard emanating from Monday’s fractured decision in the Masterpiece case, lower courts
have their work cut out for them. But at least one possibility they can consider as a result of the concurring opinion of Justices Kagan and
Breyer is that so long as careful and respectful consideration of all sides is given, state and local bodies may do what Colorado did here —
ruling against a baker like Mr. Phillips — without running afoul of the Constitution.
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